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NOTES
THE CEMETERY LOT: RIGHTS AND RESTRICTIONS
"There is nothing certain save Death and Taxes," as the old saw goes.
But while lawyers are ever conscious of laws on taxation, they regularly
ignore laws pertaining to death-except, of course, those rules dealing with
the disposition of decedents' estates. However, questions of the right to
control burial, the right to cremate, the right to be buried in a particular
cemetery lot, and survivors' rights in the lot often cause bitter controversy
between children and a surviving spouse' or between lotowner and
cemetery. Such situations often lead to litigation which could have been
avoided by an awareness of possible problems and by proper planning.
This Note will examine the rights of individuals in individual or family
cemetery lots.
2
At the outset it must be emphasized that a cemetery lot is treated for
most purposes as being unlike any other piece of real or personal property.
8
The custom of setting aside places of burial has a long history.4 From the
pyramids and cities of the dead of ancient Egypt, through the churchyards
of England,5 to the modern memorial park, civilized peoples have treated
places for the burial of the dead as deserving special protection. This
unique treatment results from the traditional absence of commercialism in
I Very frequently such controversies arise when there has been a second marriage
following divorce or death of the first spouse; the children of the first spouse and
those of the second spouse are often in disagreement. See Cowan, Report of Idea
Exchange Roundtable on Tax Problems & Corporate Structure, in 1956-1957 CEME-
TERY YEARROnK 142, 143. These problems also arise between children when there is
no surviving spouse or after the surviving spouse's interest has been determined.
See Persinger v. Persinger, 39 Ohio Op. 315, 86 N.E.2d 335 (C.P. 1949).
2 For a discussion of other areas, such as control of the burial, see JACKsoN, THE
LAW OF CADAVERS 41 (2d ed. 1950) ; STREET, MORTUARY JURISPRUDENCE 100 (1948).
Municipally operated cemeteries and cemetery districts are generally regulated by
statute. Their problems are generally similar to those of other cemeteries except
where the statute imposes special difficulties. For one such exception, see note' 98
infra. This Note will not treat questions of rights in nonprofit lotholder-owned
cemeteries, nor special problems of family or religious cemeteries; it will, however,
discuss religious restrictions generally.
3 E.g., Sams v. Sams, 242 Ala. 240, 243, 5 So. 2d 774, 776 (1942); Kerlin v.
Ramage, 200 Ala. 428, 76 So. 360 (1917); Locke v. Lester, 78 So. 2d 14 (La. Ct.
App. 1955); Abell v. Proprietors of Green Mount Cemetery, 189 Md. 363, 56 A.2d
24 (1947); Abrams v. Lakewood Park Cemetery Assn, 355 Mo. 313, 196 S.W2d
278 (1946), modified sub norn. Abrams v. Scott, 357 Mo. 937, 196 S.W.2d 278 (1948) ;
Hammerstein v. Woodlawn Cemetery, 21 Misc. 2d 42, 194 N.Y.S.2d 385 (Sup. Ct.
1960); Persinger v. Persinger, 39 Ohio Op. 315, 86 N.E.2d 335, 336 (C.P. 1949);
Lanford v. West Oakwood Cemetery Addition, Inc., 223 S.C. 350, 75 S.E.2d 865
(1953).
4 jAcKs N, op. cit. supra note 2, at 6-7, 10-13.




matters involving such property 6 and from the extensive ecclesiastical
control over burial matters and concomitant clerical discouragement of
secular intervention.7  Concern for the well-being of the family as a unit
also has been a significant factor in inducing courts and legislatures to
modify or reverse normal property rules and concepts.8 It is this combina-
tion of tradition, sentiment, family well-being, and religion which leads to
the peculiarities of cemetery law.
NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE INTEREST PURCHASED
One peculiarity of cemetery law concerns the very nature of the right
which the purchaser of a cemetery lot acquires. Although the interest
taken is usually described as one in real estate,9 at times the desire to prevent
speculation has encouraged courts to treat a cemetery lot deed as a "secu-
rity" and on that basis to hold lot salesmen in violation of "blue sky"
statutes.10 However, the treatment of a sale of a cemetery lot as anything
other than a transaction in realty has rarely arisen except in this context of
regulation of cemetery lot salesmen." This view is reinforced by decisions
holding that rights in cemetery lots pass directly to the heirs as real estate
rather than becoming a subject of administration,'2 that a property right
may be acquired by adverse possession,' 3 that conveyances are subject to
6 Persinger v. Persinger, 39 Ohio Op. 315, 86 N.E.2d 335 (C.P. 1949); cf.
JACKSON, op. ct. smpra note 2, at 13. Courts have noted that cemetery lots are not
treated as items of commerce. Abell v. Proprietors of Green Mount Cemetery, 189
Md. 363, 56 A.2d 24 (1947). Nor are they a subject for barter and sale. Fraser v.
Lee, 8 Ohio App. 235, 245 (1917). Where such plots have become items of commerce,
the court points out that a different rule prevails. Abell v. Proprietors of Green
Mount Cemetery, supra; see notes 117-21 infra and accompanying text. Nor have
courts ignored the fact that individuals do not treat such property as an ordinary
asset. Petition of Waldron, 26 R-I. 84, 58 AtI. 453 (1904).
7 JACKSON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 20-25.
8 See the discussions of alienability at notes 140-47 infra and accompanying text,
of religious restrictions at notes 87-99 infra and accompanying text, and of the rules
of descent at notes 127-36 infra and accompanying text.
9 Billings v. Paine, 319 S.W.2d 653 (Mo. 1959) ; JACKSON, op. cit. .rpra note 2,
at 362. But see Sams v. Sams, 242 Ala. 240, 5 So. 2d 774 (1942). A regular real
estate deed need not be used to convey an interest in a cemetery lot. Fraser v. Lee,
8 Ohio App. 235, 240 (1917).
10 Holloway v. Thompson, 112 Ind. App. 229, 42 N.E.2d 421 (1942); State v.
Lorentz, 221 Minn. 366, 22 N.W.2d 313 (1946); In the Matter of Walstein, 160
Misc. 763, 291 N.Y. Supp. 697 (Sup. Ct. 1936). But see Memorial Gardens of the
Valley, Inc. v. Love, 5 Utah 2d 270, 300 P.2d 628 (1956).
11But see Sams v. Sams, 242 Ala. 240, 5 So. 2d 774 (1942) (not "other real
estate!' within meaning of divorce statute).
12 In the Matter of the Estate of Rosen, 173 Misc. 433, 17 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Surr.
Ct. 1940) (based on New York statutes). This is the general rule. See Cemetery
Legal Compass, July 1940, p. 212.
13 C. L. Gray Lumber Co. v. Pickard, 220 Miss. 419, 71 So. 2d 211 (1954);
Billings v. Paine, 319 S.W.2d 653 (Mo. 1959); Corkill v. Calvary Cemetery Ass'n,
29 Ohio Op. 554' (C.P. 1944); Sherrard v. Henry, 88 W. Va. 315, 106 S.E. 705
(1921). However, the property right which may be acquired by adverse possession
rises no higher than an easement. Brown v. Hill, 284 Ill. 286, 293, 119 N.E. 977,
980 (1918).
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the statute of frauds,1 4 and that lot salesmen are required to be registered
under state real estate salesmen acts.15
Once having determined that a lot represents a right in realty, most
courts have held that a deed which grants only the right of sepulture creates
an easement or irrevocable license to use the ground for burial so long as
the cemetery remains a cemetery. 16 A few jurisdictions have described
the right as a qualified fee.' 7 However, in the interest of clarity, it would
be helpful to recognize the grant of a right of sepulture as sui generis. This
is the view adhered to by one jurisdiction ' 8 and advocated by a leading
textwriter.'9 Inasmuch as courts rarely reach divergent results merely
on the basis of the label attached to the interest,20 it is more realistic to
acknowledge the unique way in which cemetery lots are treated; otherwise
the true issues are confused and concealed by arbitrarily assigning real
property tags which have the characteristics desired for the resolution of a
particular case consonant with an appropriate though unenunciated theory
of cemetery law.
While the courts may have had difficulty in determining the interest
which a grant of sepulture creates, they have been extremely quick to
construe deeds which purport to convey a fee simple 21 as granting an
14 Cf. Kesselman v. Goldsten, 148 Neb. 452, 27 N.W.2d 692 (1947).
15 See generally Cemetery Legal Compass, Nov. 1936, pp. 17-19.
16E.g., McWhirter v. Newell, 200 IIl. 583, 66 N.E. 345 (1903) ; Antoniewicz v.
Del Prete, 166 N.E.2d 706 (Mass. 1960) ; Persinger v. Persinger, 39 Ohio Op. 315,
86 N.E.2d 335 (C.P. 1949); Fraser v. Lee, 8 Ohio App. 235 (1917). A few courts
have described the interest as being an easement only. Turkowska v. Dielendick,
321 Mass. 754, 76 N.E.2d 556 (1947); cf. Brown v. Hill, 284 Ill. 286, 119 N.E. 977
(1918); Haas v. Gahlinger, 248 S.W.2d 349 (Ky. Ct App. 1952); Hammerstein v.
Woodlawn Cemetery, 21 Misc. 2d 42, 194 N.Y.S.2d 385 (Sup. Ct 1960). Others
have characterized the interest as an irrevocable license alone. Gowen v. Bessey, 94
Me. 114, 116, 46 At. 792, 793 (1900); Page v. Symonds, 63 N.H. 17, 19 (1883);
Ez Achaim Soc'y, Inc. v. Cohen, 15 Misc. 2d 540, 181 N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. 1958);
Kincaid's Appeal, 66 Pa. 411, 421 (1870); Oak Park Cemetery v. Donaldson, 148
S.W.2d 994, 998 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1940). The latter description seems to be an
analogy to the pewholder's right See JAcKsoN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 353; Schley,
Property in Church-Pews, Market-Stalls and Lots in Cemeteries (pts. 1-2), 28 U.
PA. L. Rev. 1, 65 (1880). In Turkowska v. Dielendick, supra, the court noted that
if the interest is an easement, an action in trespass will lie, while if the interest is
a license, such an action will not lie. See also Oak Park Cemetery v. Donaldson,
supra. For a discussion of actions of trespass, see notes 101-08 infra and accompany-
ing text.
17 Silverwood v. Latrobe, 68 Md. 620, 13 At. 161 (1888). See Commissioner v.
Cedar Park Cemetery Ass'n, 183 F.2d 553 (7th Cir. 1950), where the Commissioner
attempted to claim an indefinite rental. See also Corkill v. Calvary Cemetery Ass'n,
29 Ohio Op. 554 (C.P. 1944). This concept of rental is an ancient one: "Centuries
ago in some portions of the world it seemed to be the custom to bury bodies in public
cemeteries with an annual charge for rental for the space occupied by the dead.
Failure to pay the annual rental resulted in disinterment of the bones which were
cast upon a public dump provided for such purpose." Id. at 556. Even today tombs
may be rented in sections of Louisiana.
18 Schaefer v. West Lawn Memorial Cemetery, 352 P.2d 744 (Ore. 1960);
Mansker v. Astoria, 100 Ore. 435, 198 Pac. 199 (1921).
19 JAcxsoN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 360-61.
2 o But see note 16 supra and accompanying text.
21 In most cases, however, either the language of the instrument or surrounding
circumstances give at least some indication that the grant conveyed a lot in a cemetery
and not "ordinary" realty. E.g., Love v. Robinson, 219 Pa. 469, 68 Atl. 1033 (1908)
(taken subject to rules and regulations); cf. Kansas City v. Scarritt, 169 Mo. 471,
69 S.W. 283 (1902).
CEMETERY LOTS
easement or a license only.22 As one leading commentator, Jackson, has
said in justification of this rule: "In states where the intention is to have
cemeteries owned by a corporation organized to give to the lot owners
permanent management and care, there must be a right of regulation in the
corporation. In such cases every sound legal and practical reason justifies
retention of the fee in the association so that it may exercise control." 23
However, this explanation does not fully support the judicial practice of
removing one tag (fee simple) with a well-defined meaning in other real
property areas, and substituting another (easement or license) whose gen-
eral property attributes more nearly give the desired answer in a particular
case. In ordinary circumstances, Jackson's view may be adequate justifica-
tion for the harsh step of converting a fee into a lesser property right in
that the cemetery must have the power to regulate the grounds effectively.
24
But this propensity to change labels has undesirable consequences when
different problems arise. Consider the position of a group of contiguous
lotowners, having been granted the ground in fee, who find the cemetery
poorly maintained due to a lack of administration. They desire to withdraw
in order to organize separately. As easement holders or licensees they are
precluded from doing so, even though the reason for originally reducing
their interest is inapplicable.
Even more significant consequences of reducing a fee simple title to a
mere easement or license are found in the allocation of rights upon the
abandonment of the cemetery.25  In general, the interest of the individual
2 2 E.g., Kansas City v. Scarritt, supra note 21; Pitcairn v. Homewood Cemetery,
229 Pa. 18, 77 Atl. 1105 (1910). However, in dealing with cemeteries, possession
of the fee without a right of sepulture is, for most purposes, valueless. Commissioner
v. Cedar Park Cemetery Ass'n, 183 F.2d 553 (7th Cir. 1950). But see Haas v.
Gahlinger, 248 S.W.2d 349 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952), where the court pointed out that a
conveyance in fee does not become an easement if later used for burial.
23 JAcxsoN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 359.
24 See notes 29-56 infra and accompanying text.
2 5 In addition to the possibility of losing his rights in the lot upon abandonment
of the cemetery, the lotowner is subject in some states to cancellation of his rights
in unburied graves if he abandons the lot. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 21-402 (1950)
(unincorporated associations only); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 566.20-.21 (1950) (ten
years abandonment) ; MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 21-843 (1935) (fifty years unpaid assess-
ment) ; MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 306.16, .20-.21 (Supp. 1959) (ten to twenty years);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 12-701 (1954) (ten years); S.D. CODE § 11.1905 (1939) (ten
yeas); TENN. CODE ANN. § 46-309 (Supp. 1960) (type of escheat) ; VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, §§ 5532-37 (1959) (type of escheat); WASH. RET. CODE § 68.36.010 (Supp.
1955) (five years) ; WIs. STAT. § 157.11(7d) (1957). See generally Cemetery Legal
Compass, Nov. 1938, pp. 121-26. Abandonment is defined as failure to care for the
lot over a specified number of years, ranging from five to fifty. The funds received
from the resale of the abandoned graves are used to care for graves having burials.
Such laws are an attempt to prevent unused lots from becoming overgrown with
weeds and thus making the cemetery unattractive. Although there is little doubt that
the maintenance of attractive cemeteries is a desirable goal, there would appear to be
constitutional problems in the taking, without compensation, of rights acquired prior
to the passage of such a statute. No cases have been found in which the retroactive
operation of such laws has been contested on constitutional grounds. See also
Cemetery Legal Compass, Aug. 1943, pp. 374-75, where it is reported that an opinion
of the Massachusetts Attorney-General ruled such a law unconstitutional on the
grounds that the statute would create a debtor-creditor relationship between a lot-
owner and the cemetery solely on the basis of an omission on the part of the lotowner.
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lotowner-however it may be described-is terminated and the original fee
owner regains full title.26  Owners of unused lots are probably entitled to
compensation; 27 if graves have had burials, the injury is alleviated
by proper reinterment elsewhere.28 But should the owner whose deed
purports to grant an absolute interest be governed by this proposition?
Clearly, the ordinary reason for shifting labels is no longer present. How-
ever, it is not necessary to base the loss of property rights solely on the
formalism that the owner's interest is now merely a license or an easement
-under certain circumstances, an argument for the result can be made.
Since the owner of an individual lot may have an interest so small that it is
of little economic value once the cemetery has been abandoned and since the
person desiring a tract would find it difficult to acquire the requisite number
of these small interests, the development of the land would be effectively
prevented if such a lotowner were allowed to retain his ground. By having
the full interest in many small lots revert to the original fee owner (usually
the cemetery corporation), these problems are avoided and the property
once again assumes a comnmercially marketable size. This rule is par-
ticularly important with regard to those cemeteries strategically located
near the center of large cities. Planning boards and civic improvement
groups are often anxious to force abandonment in order to provide addi-
tional area for needed construction and development and to obtain the
substantial increase in tax revenues which would result from the new uses.
In contrast, when the lot is of sufficient size to be economically valuable
in itself, there is no persuasive reason for depriving the owner of his interest
in the lot and permitting the original fee owner to avoid his grant.
The compulsion to use real property labels, with their necessary im-
plications, poses obvious difficulties. The judiciary is thereby compelled
to choose between the extremes of fee simple or license, neither of which
is adequate or desirable in all situations. On the other hand, recognition
of the peculiar nature of cemetery property would lead to corresponding
treatment keyed to the diverse needs of varying contexts.
CEMETERY RULES AND REGULATIONS
If a cemetery is to be a place of tranquility suitable for relatives of the
deceased to visit in their desire to ease the emotional shock of death and
2 6 Peebler v. Olds, 56 Cal. App. 2d 8, 132 P.2d 233 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942) ; Smith
v. Ladage, 397 Ill. 336, 74 N.E.2d 497 (1947); Cemetery Legal Compass, June 1937,
p. 49.
27 JACKSON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 400. Any other result would seem contrary
to public policy.
28 Since the lotowner would have received all that he was entitled to receive,
there should normally be no right to compensation unless the removal has been made
to a poorly maintained cemetery or there has been some other diminution of the lot-
owner's rights. Since abandonment rarely occurs except in very old, poorly maintained
cemeteries, the probability of such a diminution is small. In any case, such abandon-
ment proceedings should be under court supervision. See also Went v. Methodist
Protestant Church, 80 Hun 266, 30 N.Y. Supp. 157 (Sup. Ct. 1894), aff'd, 150 N.Y.
577, 44 N.E. 1129 (1896).
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to show respect for the dead,29 it seems necessary that the governing body
of the cemetery have the power to promulgate and enforce rules regulating
monuments, decoration of graves, and other aspects of the cemetery's
operations.30 Furthermore, the governing body is obligated to maintain
the grounds of the cemetery in safe condition 31 and to prevent damage to
adjoining lots when work is done on a particular lot.3 2  Since rules and
regulations adopted prior to the purchase of a lot are almost universally
listed in the deed or contract of sale, or are incorporated therein by refer-
ence, and since these rules are binding as a part of the contract, there is
rarely any dispute as to their enforceability.33 In addition, the power to
change these rules is customarily reserved in the original instrument. In
other areas of the law, courts have generally refused to permit one party to
make changes in a contract or to reserve the right to do so.3 4 But in
29 "The lot-holders themselves became subject to by-laws and regulations having
reference to the institution as an entirety, and the perpetual preservation of the
cemetery as an ornamental and convenient place for interment and for resort by the
relatives of the dead." Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, 107 U.S. 466, 478 (1882).
Cemetery authorities must consider "the sensibilities and feelings of other lot owners
who may have different ideas of the appropriateness of proposed monuments and
structures." Abell v. Proprietors of Green Mount Cemetery, 189 Md. 363, 366, 56
A.2d 24, 25 (1947).
30 For example, the sizes and types of vaults, the use of tents and lowering devices,
and the conduct of people visiting the grounds.
31 Campbell v. Neshannock Presbyterian Church, 153 Pa. Super. 246, 33 A.2d 33
(1943) (insure that work be done by competent men).
32 Orlowski v. St. Stanislaus Roman Catholic Church Soc'y, 161 Misc. 480, 292
N.Y. Supp. 333 (Sup. Ct 1936), appeal as poor person denied, 12 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Sup.
Ct. 1939); Campbell v. Neshannock Presbyterian Church, supra note 31.
33West View Corp. v. Alston, 208 Ga. 122, 65 S.E.2d 406 (1951) (items may not
be added to contract but cemetery may make rules more strict). But see Johnson v.
Cedar Memorial Park Cemetery Ass'n, 233 Iowa 427, 9 N.W.2d 385 (1943) ; Schaefer
v. West Lawn Memorial Cemetery, 352 P.2d 744 (Ore. 1960). Disputes are also rare
where state statutes make rules binding as against all purchasers. See, e.g., CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 8570; TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 912a.14 (1948). In some
cases protection for the public is accomplished by requiring approval of rules by a
cemetery board or department of public health. See MAss. AN. LAws ch. 114,
§§ 2, 9 (1957) ; N.Y. MEmBERsHIP CORP. LAWS § 82. And many states have statutes
specifically giving cemeteries the right to pass rules and regulations. See ALA. CODE
tit. 10, § 131 (1958) ; ALASKA Comp. LAWS ANN. § 36-5-8 (1949) ; ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 82-416 (1960) (establishment of new cemeteries); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§8300, 8302-08, 8570; CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 19-148 (1958); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 27-110 (1951); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-202 (1947); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 21, § 46
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1959); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 21-1011, -1023 (1950); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 21-1029 (Supp. 1960); KAN. GEN. SrAT. ANN. § 17-1309 (1949); MASS.
ANN. LAws ch. 114, § 2, 9 (1957) ; MicH. Comp. LAWS § 456.106 (1948) (lotowners
are members of cemetery corporation); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 306.08 (1945) ; MONT.
REv. CODES ANN. § 9-705 (1947) (mausoleums and columbariums) ; NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 12-508, -517, -518 (1954) ; N.J. REv. STAT. § 8:1-3 (1937) ; N.Y. MEMBERSHIP
CORP. LAwS § 82; OrA. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 5 (1951); ORE. REV. STAT. § 97.710
(1953) (detailed list of permissible rules) ; S.D. CODE § 11.1908 (1939) ; TENN. CODE
ANN. § 46-302 (1956); TEx. REv. CIrv. STAT. art. 912a.14 (1948); VT. STAT. tit. 15,
ch. 182, § 4009 (1947); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 68.20.060-.070 (1951) ; WASH. Rnv. CODE
§ 68.05.100 (Supp. 1953); Wis. STAT. § 157.11(2) (1957).
34 "Especially a reservation to either party of a future untrammelled right to
determine the nature of the performance . . . has often caused a promise to be too
indefinite for enforcement" WiLLISTON, CONTRAcTS § 37 (rev. ed. 1936). See also
Carranor Woods Property Owners' Ass'n v. Driscoll, 106 Ohio App. 95, 153 N.E2d
681 (1957) (restrictive covenant giving original grantor right to approve plans held
void because no standards set in covenant).
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recognition of the unique character of a cemetery lot, courts have modified
the usual law of contracts and have permitted the governing body to promul-
gate and enforce 35 "reasonable" new or changed rules against prior pur-
chasers.36  While purchasers are protected against drastic changes,37 the
leeway granted the governing body is quite extensive,38 and is governed by
a broad "rule of reason" :
Those charged with the maintenance and supervision of a cemetery
may impose reasonable regulations for the benefit of all lot holders. A
regulation is reasonable if it promotes safe and efficient administration,
protects all of the lot holders by preserving their lots, and does so
without serious interference in matters of personal or familial concern
in the conduct of the funeral and interment.3 9
Rules requiring that all foundations for monuments be built by the ceme-
tery,40 or that all tents, grass mats, and lowering devices be supplied by the
35 See notes 40-46 infra and accompanying text.
36 Donohue v. Fitzsimmons, 95 NJ. Eq. 125, 122 Atl. 617 (Ch. 1923); Mansker
v. Astoria, 100 Ore. 435, 198 Pac. 199 (1921); Pitcairn v. Homewood Cemetery Co.,
229 Pa. 18, 77 AtI. 1105 (1910) ; Dries v. Charles Evans Cemetery Co., 109 Pa. Super.
498, 167 Atl. 237 (1933). But see Slifer v. Greenmount Cemetery Co., 164 Pa. Super.
534, 67 A.2d 584, 585 (1949) ("A power to regulate is not a power to destroy. It is
not and cannot be a power to diminish the grant by subsequent restrictions which
impose onerous financial burdens upon the lot-holders."); Estate of Blackburn, 230
Wis. 570, 284 N.W. 491 (1939) (cemetery held bound by general laws of contract).
See generally BRENNAN, LAW GOVERNING CEMETERY RULES AND REGULATIONS (rev.
ed. 1951) [hereinafter cited as RULES AND REGULATIONS]. This is the most compre-
hensive survey of cemetery rules and regulations, containing an extensively annotated
set of recommended rules and regulations, as well as the author's opinion on doubtful
points.
37 Steele v. Rosehill Cemetery Co., 370 IIl. 405, 19 N.E.2d 189 (1938), appeal
dinissed, 307 U.S. 611 (1939) (cemetery tried to refuse to permit burial until back
care charges accumulated without consent of lotowner were paid or until lot was
placed under perpetual care) ; Mansker v. Astoria, supra note 36 (attempt to force
endowment care); Slifer v. Greenmount Cemetery Co., supra note 36; Estate of
Blackburn, supra note 36 (decision said to be based on application of binding nature
of deed). See generally RULES AND REGULATIONS 20-24.
38 Gasser v. Crown Hill Cemetery Ass'n, 103 Colo. 175, 84 P.Zd 67 (1938);
Luttenberger v. Restland Memorial Park Ass'n, 51 N.J. Super. 507, 144 A.2d 12
(Super. Ct 1958) (upholding rule requiring vault to be set by cemetery where fee was
charged for such service) ; Frank v. Clover Leaf Park Cemetery Ass'n, 48 N.J. Super.
453, 137 A.2d 605 (Super. Ct 1957), modified and remanded, 29 N.J. 193, 148 A.2d 488
(1959); Ez Achaim Soc'y, Inc. v. Cohen, 15 Misc. 2d 540, 181 N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup.
Ct 1958) (upholding rule requiring approval of monument inscriptions). See also
Schaefer v. West Lawn Memorial Cemetery, 352 P.2d 744 (Ore. 1960) (restriction
requiring marker to be purchased through cemetery). Under proper rules a private
cemetery may refuse to bury undesirable persons-for example, murderers. Cemetery
Legal Compass, April 1947, p. 549. But see People ex rel. Paxton v. Bloomington
Cemetery Ass'n, 353 Ill. 534, 187 N.E. 455 (1933).
39 Ignatowski v. St. Mary's Polish Catholic Cemetery Co., 174 Pa. Super. 52,
54, 98 A.2d 234, 235 (1953). Matters held not to be of personal or familial concern
include tents, lowering devices, and similar items, Campbell v. Neshannock Presby-
terian Church, 153 Pa. Super. 246, 33 A.2d 33 (1943), and use of steel vaults, Dries
v. Evans Cemetery Co., 109 Pa. Super. 498, 167 AtI. 237 (1933). But limiting the
vault to a particular make is such an interference. Iguatowski v. St Mary's Polish
Catholic Cemetery Co., supra. See also Luttenberger v. Restland Memorial Park
Ass'n, 51 N.J. Super. 507, 517, 144 A.2d 12, 17 (Super. Ct. 1958) (rule must pass
"tests of clarity, uniformity, and equal applicability to all lot owners").
40 Pine Crest Memorial Park v. Burton, 312 S.W.2d 919 (Ark. 1958) (installing
bronze markers); Terwilliger v. Graceland Memorial Park Ass'n, 59 N.J. Super.
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cemetery,41 or that all vaults be set by the cemetery 42 have been upheld.
Other rules regulating the alloy of bronze markers 43 or the type of vault
to be used 44 have sometimes been voided-usually where there was sub-
stantial evidence that the cemetery was trying to secure a monopoly over
supply of such items 4 5 However, even if monopolistic tendencies appear, a
strong showing of reasonableness will be sufficient to sustain the rule.
4 6
Most frequently, litigation with regard to after-adopted rules has
concerned regulations prohibiting the lotowner from planting or decorating
the lot in the manner he desires. 47 It has been almost uniformly held that
the lotowner may decorate the lot himself or may use any sufficiently skilled
205, 157 A.2d 567 (Super. Ct 1960) (installing bronze markers). But unreasonable
rates may not be charged. Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Memorial Park, 43 N.J.
Super. 244, 128 A.2d 281 (Super. Ct. 1957). See also Donohue v. Fitzsimmons,
95 N.J. Eq. 125, 122 At. 617 (Ch. 1923) (regulation relating to setting monument
and requiring permit of cemetery upheld). Contra, Chariton Cemetery Co. v. Chariton
Granite Works, 197 Iowa 403, 197 N.W. 457 (1924) (foundations had been installed
unsatisfactorily by cemetery). Brennan questions the validity of such a rule as applied
against persons purchasing prior to its adoption. RULES AND REGULATIONS 177-79.
However, his only authority seems to be the Chariton case.
41 A. W. Carlson Inc. v. Judd, 133 Conn. 74, 48 A.2d 269 (1946) ; Orlowski v.
St Stanislaus Roman Catholic Church Soc'y, 161 Misc. 480, 292 N.Y. Supp. 333
(Sup. Ct 1936), appeal as poor person denied, 12 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Sup. Ct 1939);
Campbell v. Neshannock Presbyterian Church, 153 Pa. Super. 246, 33 A.2d 33 (1943);
RULES AND REGULATIONS 63-66.
4 2 Lawson v. Woodmere, Inc., 217 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1954) (held not to be a
violation of the antitrust laws) ; Tatman v. Rochester Lodge No. 47, I.O.O.F., 164
N.E. 718 (Ind. 1929) (no tendency to create monopoly); Luttenberger v. Restland
Memorial Park Ass'n, 51 N.J. Super. 507, 144 A.2d 12 (Super. Ct. 1958); RULES
AND REGULATIONS 40-46. Contra, Roselawn Memorial Park v. De Wall, 11 Il. App.
2d 66, 136 N.E.2d 702 (1956) (method used by cemetery shown to be inferior to
that used by outsider).
4 3 Pine Crest Memorial Park v. Burton, 312 S.W.2d 919 (Ark. 1958) (alloy
requirements not unreasonable but rule requiring laboratory analysis void). See also
Johnson v. Cedar Memorial Park Cemetery Ass'n, 233 Iowa 427, 9 N.W.2d 385
(1943) (rule requiring bronze only upheld as against subsequent purchaser; court
implied such a rule might be good even against prior purchaser if cemetery were
memorial park).
44 People ex rel. Paxton v. Bloomington Cemetery Ass'n, 353 Ill. 534, 187 N.E.
455 (1933) (quo warranto proceeding); Ignatowski v. St Mary's Polish Catholic
Cemetery Co., 174 Pa. Super. 52, 98 A.2d 234 (1953). Generally, no violation of
antitrust laws is involved. See Lawson v. Woodmere, Inc., 217 F.2d 148 (4th Cir.
1954). Contra, Dries v. Evans Cemetery Co., 109 Pa. Super. 498, 167 Atl. 237 (1933)
(steel vaults did not prevent sinking).
45 Pine Crest Memorial Park v. Burton, 312 S.W.2d 919 (Ark. 1958) (laboratory
analysis requirement tended toward monopoly) ; People ex rel. Paxton v. Blooming-
ton Cemetery Ass'n, 353 Ill. 534, 187 N.E. 455 (1933) (quo warranto proceeding) ;
Ignatowski v. St Mary's Polish Catholic Cemetery Co., 174 Pa. Super. 52, 98 A.2d
234 (1953). See also Frank v. Clover Leaf Park Cemetery Ass'n, 48 N.J. Super.
453, 137 A.2d 605 (Super. Ct 1957), modified and remanded, 29 N.J. 193, 148 A.2d
488 (1959).
46 Pine Crest Memorial Park v. Burton, 312 S.W.2d 919 (Ark. 1958) (high
lead content would be harmful in bronze marker) ; Schaefer v. West Lawn Memorial
Cemetery, 352 P.2d 744 (Ore. 1960) (cemetery would purchase from any bronze
manufacturer, but marker had to be purchased through cemetery); Dries v. Evans
Cemetery Co., 109 Pa. Super. 498, 167 Atl. 237 (1933) (rule preventing use of steel
vaults adopted in order to prevent the grave from sinking).
4 7 E.g., Scott v. Lakewood Cemetery Ass'n, 167 Minn. 223, 208 N.W. 811 (1926);
Cedar Hill Cemetery Co. v. Lees, 22 Pa. Super. 405 (1902) ; RULES AND REGULATIONS
93-111.
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agent to decorate it 48 so long as plants or materials forbidden by reasonable
rules are not used. Although there has been no case directly in point, it
would not seem unreasonable for the cemetery to require that it be notified
as to the nature of such work and when it is to be done and that it be
permitted to inspect the decorations when completed4 Such requirements
are designed to prevent substandard work and trespasses on adjoining
lots.
50
Several reasons have been advanced to justify the binding effect of
after-adopted rules and regulations on purchasers of cemetery lots. One
authority suggests that:
Many of the rules and regulations are merely management or adminis-
trative rules necessary to keep the cemetery or park clean and eco-
nomically maintained. To have to propose each administrative rule
to a group of lot owners for their approval before it can be carried
out would be impossibly cumbersome . . . . As times change and
new machinery changes, maintenance and administrative customs and
policies, rules and regulations must be changed. To run the cemetery
efficiently, management must retain the right to change these rules
and regulations and, in general, lot owners wholeheartedly support
that right of management.51
Jackson contends that such changes are merely an extension of the original
contract which reserved the right to amend the rules. 52 Another authority
has suggested that this power is analogous to a municipality's power to
regulate the use of property by means of zoning laws.53 For the good of
4sE.g., Scott v. Lakewood Cemetery Ass'n, upra note 47; Mansker v. Astoria,
100 Ore. 435, 198 Pac. 199 (1921); Benson v. Laurel Hill Cemetery Co., 68 Pa.
Super. 242 (1917). See also Chariton Cemetery Co. v. Chariton Granite Works,
197 Iowa 403, 197 N.W. 457 (1924) (skilled agent may install foundation where
cemetery had not installed satisfactory foundations) ; Campbell v. Neshannock Pres-
byterian Church, 153 Pa. Super. 246, 33 A.2d 33 (1943). Contra, Cedar Hill Ceme-
tery Co. v. Lees, stupra note 47 (pleasant appearance of cemetery can be maintained
only by cemetery regulation of work). Cedar Hill was apparently approved in Slifer
v. Greenmount Cemetery Co., 164 Pa. Super. 534, 67 A.2d 584 (1949).49 For a similar situation where the court rejected as unreasonable a rule requiring
bronze markers to be installed by the cemetery but implied that it could require such
installation to be under the cemetery's supervision, see Frank v. Clover Leaf Park
Cemetery Ass'n, 48 N.J. Super. 453, 137 A.2d 605 (Super. Ct 1957), modified and
remanded, 29 N.J. 193, 148 A.2d 488 (1959). Brennan also suggests that such a rule
would be valid. RULES AND REGULATiONS 111-14.
50 Orlowski v. St. Stanislaus Roman Catholic Church Sody, 161 Misc. 480, 292
N.Y. Supp. 333 (Sup. Ct. 1936), appeal as poor person denied, 12 N.Y.S.2d 350
(Sup. Ct 1939); Scott v. Lakewood Cemetery Ass'n, 167 Minn. 223, 208 N.W. 811
(1926).5 1 Letter From James Worley, executive vice president, American Cemetery
Ass'n, to Montefiore Cemetery Co., Philadelphia, Pa., Aug. 16, 1960. This letter
does not represent the official opinion of the ACA but only the personal opinion of
Mr. Worley based on his belief as to the consensus of the association.
52 JACKSON, THE LAW OF CADAVERS 383 (2d ed. 1950).
53 Letter From Harry E. Sanders, secretary, Cemetery Ass'n of Pennsylvania,
to Montefiore Cemetery Co., Philadelphia, Pa., Aug. 17, 1960. Cemetery rules
which prohibit or require certain future acts, such as those requiring that tents be
supplied by the cemetery, or that no steel vaults may be used after a certain date,
are analogous to those provisions of zoning laws which prevent certain types of
future development. There also is a nonconforming use problem similar to that of
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the cemetery as a unit, the rules and regulations must be amendable and
those amendments must be binding so that fresh ideas-such as the use of
concrete vaults-may be fully utilized and so that changing conditions may
be met.5 4  New developments and greater experience often indicate that
modifications of current practice would improve the safety and attractive-
ness of the cemetery. Furthermore, lotowners frequently attempt to deco-
rate their own lots in such a manner as to trespass upon 55 or otherwise
hinder 56 adjoining lotowners. This can be stopped more quickly and
effectively by cemetery regulation than by action by the aggrieved lotowner.
It is, therefore, a natural consequence of the governing body's responsibility
for perpetually preserving the cemetery in a manner suitable for the burial
of the dead that such rules be enforceable.
RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS RESTRICTIONS
Racial Restrictions
A more serious question arises when a cemetery, by rules and regula-
tions or by contract, seeks to establish racial or religious restrictions for
burials in its lots. Of these, racial restrictions are more frequently sub-
jected to attack. State courts have repeatedly held that racial restrictions
are binding,57 at least against persons purchasing lots after the enactment
zoning. This occurs when cemetery attempts to force changes in existing plantings
or monuments. In determining the validity of these rules, the standard of "reason-
ableness" would require greater support than a rule which merely attempts to regulate
future actions. However, it would seem that rules which gave such "nonconforming"
uses sufficient time to make changes would be reasonable.
54Letter From Raymond Louis Brennan, general counsel, Interment Ass'n of
California, to Montefiore Cemetery Co., Philadelphia, Pa., Sept. 1, 1960: "As an
example, which is rather pointed only for the purpose of the discussion, some of the
early rules and regulations provided that horse drawn carriages should travel at a
certain limited rate of speedl This was the day before the automobile and, obviously,
nothing was said about automobiles. That a cemetery should be able to adopt rules
and regulations regulating the use of automobiles in the cemetery grounds is good
and sound. Some of the present rules bar horse drawn carriages from coming into
the cemetery . . . . Another illustration is where wooden boxes were originally
permitted when the lot was sold, and under present conditions the new rule should
require a box made of concrete to prevent the sinking of graves." This justification
is also mentioned in Letter From Martin Gaudian, executive vice president, National
Ass'n of Cemeteries, to Montefiore Cemetery Co., Philadelphia, Pa., Oct. 3, 1960.
This letter does not represent the official opinion of the NAC but only Mr. Gaudian's
personal beliefs.
55 Orlowski v. St. Stanislaus Roman Catholic Church Soc'y, 161 Misc. 480, 292
N.Y. Supp. 333 (Sup. Ct. 1936), appeal as poor person denied, 12 N.Y.S.2d 350
(Sup. Ct. 1939) (exception to unlimited right of lotowner to adorn and decorate).
r6 For example, by erecting monuments with inscriptions which upset other
visitors to the cemetery. See Ez Achaim Soc'y, Inc. v. Cohen, 15 Misc. 2d 540, 181
N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (inscription read: "Beneath This Stone Lies A Woman
Who Loved Life But Was Murdered By A Doctor Whose Name Is Not Worthy
to Appear Here').
57 Long v. Mountain View Cemetery Ass'n, 130 Cal. App. 2d 328, 278 P.2d 945
(Dist Ct. App. 1955); Forest Lawn Memorial Park Ass'n v. De Jarette, 79 Cal.
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of the rule.58 Reacting to this practice, several state legislatures have
enacted statutes specifically prohibiting racial restrictions 59 and, in some
cases, refusal to bury for racial reasons has been made criminal.
60 Where
such legislation has been passed, courts have been willing to give broad
scope to the policy embodied in the act and have stricken restrictive clauses
even before a refusal to bury.61
Even in the absence of a statute prohibiting such restrictions, the
validity of racial restraints is in doubt. Much of the uncertainty has been
created by Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.,
6 2 in which
defendant, relying upon a contractual restriction, had refused to bury a
person having eleven-sixteenths Winnebago Indian blood. The widow,
who was the original purchaser, sued for damages and asked that the
covenant be declared void. The Supreme Court of Iowa 63 upheld the
validity of the racial restraint, distinguishing earlier United States Supreme
Court decisions on the ground that state aid was not here given to the party
seeking to enforce the covenant. On writ of certiorari,
6 an evenly divided
Court affirmed the Iowa court's holding without opinion.
6 5 But apparently
the Court was unaware that, prior to the grant of certiorari, Iowa had
App. 601, 250 Pac. 581 (Dist. Ct. App. 1926); Long v. Mountain View Cemetery
Ass'n, No. 238848 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1953), in Cemetery Legal Compass, July 1953,
p. 853; People ex rel. Gaskill v. Forest Home Cemetery Co., 258 Il. 36, 101 N.E.
219 (1913), appeal dismnissed, 238 U.S. 606 (1915); Rice v. Sioux City Memorial
Park Cemetery, Inc., 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110 (1953), aff'd per curiam by an
equally divided Court, 348 U.S. 880 (1954), vacated on rehearing and cert. dismissed,
349 U.S. 70 (1955) ; Leathers v. Odd Fellows Rest, 138 La. 15, 69 So. 858 (1915).
For an extreme example of this type of restriction, see College Park Cemetery
Properties, Inc. v. Cottongim, 185 Ga. 741, 196 S.E. 409 (1938). In College Park,
the cemetery had a rule providing that no one except white persons would be permitted
to do any work on any of the lots unless such person be accompanied by a lotowner
or a member of the lotowner's family. Where a florist had used colored employees,
the court refused to modify a partial injunction directing that colored employees were
to work under the direct control of defendant florist and only after approval by
superintendent and lotowner. Contra, Memphis S.L.R.R. v. Forest Hill Cemetery
Co., 116 Tenn. 400, 94 S.W. 69 (1906).
58 Mt Moriah Cemetery Ass'n v. Commonwealth, 81 Pa. 235 (1876) (person
purchasing prior to passage of rule held not bound despite claim of other lotowners
and cemetery that large loss in value would result unless rule upheld. But see Ruils
AND REGULATIONS 57-63.
59IowA CoDE ANN. § 566A.8 (Supp. 1960); N.J. REv. STAT. § 10:1-9 (1960);
N.Y. MEMBERSHIP CoRP. LAWS §§ 84(2), 88; N.Y. PEN. LAws § 514(2); S.D. CODE
§11.19A08 (Supp. 1960).
60 N.J. REv. STAT. § 10:1-9 (1960); N.Y. PEN. LAWS § 514(2). See also In
the Matter of George Washington Memorial Park Cemetery Ass'n, 52 N.J. Super.
519, 145 A.2d 665 (Super. Ct. 1958), upholding the New Jersey statute in an action
to strike a racial covenant in quo warranto proceedings.
6 1 In the Matter of George Washington Memorial Park Cemetery Ass'n, supra
note 60.
62245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110 (1953), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided
Court, 348 U.S. 880 (1954), vacated on rehearing and cert. dismissed, 349 U.S. 70
(1955).
63 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110 (1953).
64347 U.S. 942 (1954).
65348 U.S. 880 (1954).
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enacted a statute forbidding racial restrictions on cemetery lots.6 6 On re-
hearing, the then fully informed Court determined that the existence of the
statute necessitated vacation of the affirmance and withdrawal of certiorari
on grounds that it had been improvidently granted.67 This set of opinions
has been interpreted as upholding the cemeteries' right to make and enforce
racial restrictions.6 8  However, if certain Supreme Court opinions are
pressed to their full logical limits, all racial restrictions are constitutionally
unenforceable by state court action. Shelley v. Kraemer 69 held that the
state court's enforcement of a racial covenant designed to preclude the
ownership or occupancy of real estate by Negroes was sufficient state
action to support invocation of the fourteenth amendment prohibitions
against deprivation of equal protection of the laws. Likewise, Barrows v.
Jackson 70 prevented a state court from allowing damages for breach of such
a covenant. If this concept of state action is generally applicable, it is
evident that state court enforcement of burial restrictions based on race
will not be allowed to stand.
The difficulties inherent in reading Shelley as prohibiting state effectua-
tion of any private racial bigotry 7 1 have prompted Professor Pollak 72 to
suggest that these decisions do not ban all such state activity, but interdict
only that utilization of state power which forces an individual to discrim-
inate.73 By this analysis an attempt to ban resale of lots to members of a
particular race is unenforceable inasmuch as the agreement would, if en-
forced, preclude the original purchaser's subsequent sale to a person of that
race, regardless of his own prejudices or lack of them. On the other hand,
a provision forbidding burial because of race would be enforced against the
original purchaser since the state power is utilized not to force the buyer
to discriminate against others but merely to uphold the voluntary private
perversity of the cemetery.74 Should the original purchaser transfer his
interest,75 the restriction on burial would fall within the reach of the four-
66 IovA CODE ANN. § 566A.8 (Supp. 1960). This statute was apparently ap-
plicable in all cases except that of petitioner. Iowa Sess. Laws 1953, ch. 84, § 12.
Mr. justice Douglas noted that this circumstance raised an equal protection problem
as serious as the question raised on the merits. 349 U.S. 70, 80 (1955) (dissenting
opinion).
67349 U.S. 70 (1955).
68 Letter From James Worley, supra note 51.
69 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
70 346 U.S. 249 (1953). But see Johnson v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 131 F. Supp.
114 (E.D. Pa. 1955); Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 531-36, 87
N.E.2d 541, 549-51 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950).
71 See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L.
REv. 1, 29-30 (1959).
72 Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor
Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959).
73 Id. at 12-13.
74 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (private action not within scope
of fourteenth amendment). This idea was a basis of the Iowa Supreme Court's
decision in the Rice case.
75 The cemetery could require that the lot be resold only to the cemetery or only
after the cemetery has refused to repurchase.
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teenth amendment, for to enforce the restraint against a later purchaser
would effectively remove that purchaser from the class of potential buyers-
the purchase would be economically useless.76 In such a case a state
court's enforcement of the restriction on burial would have the same
effect as enforcing a restriction on resale: 7 7 in both the racial class dis-
criminated against would be barred from purchasing because of state court
action which forces the original purchaser to discriminate against members
of a class. In the one instance, he cannot convey anything of economic
value; in the other, he cannot convey at all.78
A more expansive view of the Shelley doctrine than that taken
by Pollak would include in the fourteenth amendment protection all dealings
except an initial refusal to deal with a certain racial class. 79 If legal action
is taken by the individual against whom the cemetery discriminated, state
judicial action--or inaction-"enforcing" the refusal would take the nega-
tive form of a nonsuit or dismissal rather than the positive enforcement of
a discriminatory contract. On the basis of this constitutional line, a ceme-
tery would be free to refrain from selling lots to persons of a given race in
the absence of a state statute making such conduct unlawful.
Cemetery racial restrictions might be brought within the scope of the
fourteenth amendment by the operation of doctrines other than that of the
Shelley case. Clearly, if the cemetery is municipally owned or managed,
the constitutional prohibition is effective.80  But all cemeteries-not merely
those which are municipally operated-perform a vital public function, both
in providing for the healthful disposal of the dead and in offering a place
where sentiment and tradition may be preserved. Though these activities
are not as apparently governmental as were those of the company town
in Marsh v. Alabama,8s they do evidence the quasi-public nature of cemetery
76 This is very similar to the situation in Barrows v. Jackson, 349 U.S: 249 (1953),
except that in Barrows it was the seller who was economically penalized whereas
here it is the buyer who suffers.
77 See Barrows v. Jackson, supra note 76, which was also an attempt to use an
indirect approach in enforcing the covenant by suing the seller for damages. The
Supreme Court ignored the form of the action-as well as overriding serious questions
of standing to litigate-in order to void the provision.
7 8 Whether the Rice situation presents unconstitutional discrimination under Pol-
lak's theory is unclear. Is the owner of the lot not forced to limit her choice as to
whom she will allow to be buried in her lot? Professor Pollak apparently thinks
otherwise. See Pollak, supra note 72, at 15 n.57.
7 0 Compare Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See also Levitt & Sons, Inc.
v. Division Against Discrimination, 31 N.J. 514, 158 A.2d 177, appeal dismissed, 363
U.S. 418 (1960). The cemetery could also require that any person desiring to resell
his lot offer it to the cemetery first.
80 See Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
An interesting problem is raised if the municipality attempts to maintain "separate
but equal" cemeteries. The widely ranging per curiam opinions in the aftermath
of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), reargument, 349 U.S. 294 (1955),
indicate that such an arrangement would be unconstitutional. See Holmes v. City
of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir.), vacated, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam);
Dawson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 350 U.S.
877 (1955).
81326 U.S. 501 (1946). See also Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Division Against Dis-
crimination, 31 N.J. 514, 158 A.2d 177 (1960) (state law required FHA-financed
development to deal with all buyers without discrimination).
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operation. Whether they are sufficient to denominate cemetery action as
that of the state is questionable. And even if the Marsh theory does
encompass cemeteries, the resulting rule must be framed so as to reflect
certain basic differences among cemeteries. The nonsectarian profit ceme-
tery or memorial park should not be permitted to restrict on a racial
basis inasmuch as it holds itself out as a place for fulfilling the community's
needs for a safe and attractive place for the burial of the dead. If the oper-
ators of such a cemetery are restricting sales by race, they are likely doing
so for economic reasons alone, 2 and there is relatively little justification
for allowing an organ of the community to maintain an economic advantage
for one group by depriving another group of its position as a part of the
public which is supposedly being served. Nor should cemeteries operated
by and for the benefit of religious societies-whether for profit or not 133
be able to claim a valid religious restriction if persons of the race against
which the restriction is directed were accepted into the society during life.
However, in the case of "lotowner-owned" nonprofit cemeteries, a different
rule is supportable. These cemeteries more nearly approach the character-
istics of a private club; 84 they do not purport to serve the community at
large. Inasmuch as the selection of a resting place for the dead is a matter
of private, emotional concern, there should be some outlet provided for those
whose prejudices are so strong that such a restriction is essential for their
peace of mind. 5 Note, however, that any such theory of private associa-
tion would not, of course, release a cemetery from the operation of the
Shelley doctrine.8 6
Religious Restrictions
Religious restrictions occupy a fundamentally different position.
Classification along religious lines by cemeteries is not unreasonable, since
for thousands of years burial-in both savage and civilized countries 87___
82 The alternative reason would be discrimination for discrimination's sake-obvi-
ously within the fourteenth amendment if the cemetery's action can be viewed as
that of the state.
83 Since cemeteries run by religious societies are not profitmaking organizations
in the ordinary sense, restriction of the rule to profit cemeteries would result in its
inapplicability in this area. Such cemeteries hold themselves out as being open to
members of the church by which they are operated; it therefore seems inadvisable
to permit the possibility that a church member may be barred from the church burying
grounds because of race. Inasmuch as burial within the confines of the church ceme-
tery is likely to be one of the more important rights of church membership, a depri-
vation of these rights constitutes an unequal situation-one not unlike that prevailing
when education is segregated.
84This view is suggested by a letter quoted in Cemetery Legal Compass, July
1953, p. 854.
85 "We must never forget that cemeteries are primarily sacred memorial places.
Without respect for identity, nothing can be remembered. Similarly, one cannot
establish a memorial to an ideal, a person, or a group whom he is prohibited from
identifying. People should have and must have the right freely to establish their
own associations." Letter From James Worley, supra note 51.
86 See notes 69-78 mipra and accompanying text.
87 JAcxsol, op. cit. supra note 52, at 1-3, 13.
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has been a religious rite.8  Indeed, until comparatively recent times,
control of the burial and the cemetery was almost completely controlled by
the ecclesiastical authorities to the exclusion of secular courts, 9 and today
burial continues to be basically a religious rite.9 ° In many faiths detailed
rules are administered by ecclesiastical authorities.9 1 Refusal to permit
burial in consecrated ground is still considered a most severe sanction by
some religious groups.
2
It is not surprising, therefore, that courts have been reluctant to inter-
fere with religious restrictions or administration.93 The question seems to
be so well settled that cases requiring a decision on the subject have rarely
come before the courts in recent years. Even in the absence of a rule re-
stricting burial to members of the faith, courts have frequently refused to
order the burial of nonbelievers in a strictly religious cemetery.9 4 Per-
8 8 Id. at 1-l8
89 For a discussion of early burial practices, see Gilbert v. Buzzard, 3 Phill. 335,
161 Eng. Rep. 1342 (Ecc. 1820).
90 See Kerin, Christian Burial Problems, 15 JURIST 252 (1955) (Roman Catholic
rules for burial) ; Cemetery Legal Compass, Feb. 1943, pp. 349-51 (Christian burial).
But see Russian Orthodox Church Appeal, 397 Pa. 126, 152 A.2d 489 (1959), where
it was held that a cemetery was not a use of land for religious practices within the
meaning of a zoning act. The facts that the owner was a religious body and that
burial rites were spiritually essential were unpersuasive. Compare Williams v. Ramey,
201 Ga. 737, 41 S.E.2d 159 (1947).
91 See Kerin, mipra note 90.
92 For example, the Roman Catholic Church refuses to bury suicides. Kerin,
supra note 90, at 263-64. See generally Cemetery Legal Compass, April 1947, pp.
549-51, citing many early cases in which the right of burial in a religious cemetery
was refused as a result of a violation of the rules of the faith.
93 E.g., Dwenger v. Geary, 113 Ind. 106, 14 N.E. 903 (1888) ; Seifer v. Schwim-
mer, 166 Misc. 329, 1 N.Y.S.2d 730 (Sup. Ct 1937); People ex rel. Coppers v.
Trustees of St. Patrick Cathedral, 21 Hun 184 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1880) ; Brnilovich v.
St George Independent Serbian Orthodox Church, 326 Pa. 218, 191 At. 655 (1937).
Most authorities in the field are in accord. "A religious restriction is something
different. Anyone is eligible to become a member of a religious sect, and if he does,
he would be entitled to the use of the religious cemetery. I can see the reason why
those of a particular religious group would want to be in a cemetery, or an area
within a cemetery, restricted to members of their own religious faith. Yes, I believe
that religious restriction covenants are valid, and I am inclined to think that even a
statute that would attempt to tamper with this would be unconstitutional." Letter
From Raymond Louis Brennan, supra note 54. "As I've already pointed out, burial
is a semi-sacred rite. Surely Roman Catholics, Jews, Methodists, Lutherans, Budd-
hists would be deprived of one of their inalienable rights if they could not set aside
burying grounds for themselves." Letter From James Worley, supra note 51. See
also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7980; IND. ANN. STAT. § 21-1003 (1950);
JACKSON, op. cit. supra note 52, at 379.
94 E.g., People ex rel. Coppers v. Trustees of St. Patrick's Cathedral, 21 Hun
184 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1880) : "Where a party applies for a burial plot, at the office of
a distinctively Roman Catholic cemetery, it is with the tacit understanding that he
is either a Roman Catholic, and as such eligible to burial, or at least that he applies
on behalf of those who are in communion with the church . . . . The parties may,
notwithstanding, contract, if they choose, in such a manner that any one, even a
Buddhist, Mohammedan, or avowed Atheist, will have a legal right to sepulture in
the plot; and the law will give effect to their bargain. But to accomplish such an
object, to contract in entire disregard of the church laws, usages and customs applicable
to the cemetery, to give the vendee an absolute right to disturb what is believed to be
the spiritual harmony of the surroundings, a very different instrument from this
simple receipt would have to be secured." Id. at 194.
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mitting such restrictions has the support not only of a long tradition of
noninterference but also recognizes the necessity imposed by the practical
differences between the burial rites of the various religions.9 5 The problems
of properly consecrating ground for Roman Catholic burial9 6 and the
requirements of segregating burials of men from women under traditional
Orthodox Judaism 97 are too diverse to require intermixing. Furthermore,
such restrictions are so tied up with the exercise of religion that they might
even be regarded as coming within the constitutional protection of the first
and fourteenth amendments. This pervading religious atmosphere which
surrounds burial is descriptive of all types of cemeteries,98 not merely those
directly affiliated with a church. The private corporation which burys Jews
only is essentially a cemetery of that faith, and thus its rules are not of an
arbitrary character.99
PROTECTION OF THE PURCHASER'S INTEREST
Although rules and regulations will often have provisions designed to
protect the lotowner's interests, occasionally it is necessary to resort to relief
drawn from other fields of the law. Because a cemetery lot is a type of real
property, 00 an individual lotowner may bring an action for trespass.' 0 '
95 "Moreover, the burial ceremony of each church is a part of its ritual and
they differ one from the other. The different burial rituals evidently were a factor
in establishing separate burial grounds in the early days of the country's history.
(Possibly those who believe in making everything uniform from the cradle to the
grave would make light of the religious convictions of people who would prefer a
resting place with those of like faith.)" Letter From Harry E. Sanders, supra note 53.
For an extreme example of these religious differences, note the unique customs of
the Parsees: "This almost fanatic devotion to ceremonial purity accounts for their
unique method of disposing of the bodies of the dead. Since they reverence the earth
as well as the fire, they neither bury nor cremate corpses, but expose them on dakhmas,
'Towers of Silence,' in secluded places where birds come and devour the flesh, and
the bones are left to dry. Twice a year the bones are collected and cast into the
central well of the dakhma where they are eventually reduced to dust by the action
of sun, rain, and air." PoTTER, FAITHS MEN LIVE By 45 (1954). See also Burial
Custons in the Land of the Rising Sun, Am. Cemetery, Jan. 1960, pp. 17-21.
96 Kerin, Christian Burial Problems, 15 JURIST 252 (1955).
97 This custom has been almost abandoned in recent years. However, many
unusual customs still prevail. See Mayerberg, Burial Customs Observed by People
of the Jewish Faith, Am. Cemetery, March 1960, p. 27.98 Municipally operated cemeteries must be distinguished. Although one might
expect to find in them a "religious" atmosphere, there are no natural religious limits,
for the cemetery purports to serve the entire city or town. The dominant character-
istic is government service rather than attachment to a particular religion. Dis-
crimination based on religion by such a cemetery would be unreasonable and violative
of the fourteenth amendment.
99 Of course, a religious restriction may be arbitrary. Thus, a rule allowing
burial of all but Jews would raise an equal protection question. On the problems of
state action in such a case, see notes 69-86 supra and accompanying text
300 See notes 9-20 mipra and accompanying text.
101 Bushers v. Graceland Cemetery Ass'n, 171 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Ill. 1958);
Smith & Gaston Funeral Directors, Inc. v. Wilson, 262 Ala. 401, 79 So. 2d 48 (1955) ;
West View Corp. v. Alexander, 83 Ga. App. 810, 65 S.E.2d 38 (1951); Humphreys
v. Bennett Oil Corp., 195 La. 531, 197 So. 222 (1940). But there is no right of
ejectment Stewart v. Garrett, 119 Ga. 386, 46 S.E. 427 (1904). Contra, Corkill v.
Calvary Cemetery Ass'n, 29 Ohio Op. 554 (C.P. 1944) (ejectment of burial even
where title obtained by adverse possession). See generally Cemetery Legal Compass,
May 1958, pp. 1085-86; Note, Cemeteries, Nature of Interest of "Ouner" of Cemetery
Lot-Trespass, Remedies at Law & in Equity, 15 B.U.L. Rav. 307 (1935).
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In several instances, recovery on a theory of trespass has been allowed
where oil drilling rigs have been erected on cemetery grounds in order to
tap fields beneath the cemetery, even though the particular lot was un-
touched.102  However, in one case the slanting of an oil well into cemetery
grounds from outside, with the consent of the cemetery management, was
held not to be an actionable trespass.103  The dumping of mine refuse on a
grave was held to be a continuing trespass, ° 4 as was burial of a stranger
in the lot.'0 5 This action is often confused with an action for desecration
of the grave, which arises when one not entitled to perform work on the lot
destroys plants or removes or defaces a monument.'0 6 The difference is of
significance if a relative who is not the owner of the lot brings the action,'0 7
or if the jurisdiction in question does not allow damages for mental
anguish in trespass actions.'
0 8
Although interference with the use of roads or pathways can otherwise
be enjoined, 09 the cemetery frequently reserves the right to replat roads
and pathways." 0 Several states have enacted statutes permitting such
replatting, with the condition that the funds received must be either con-
tributed to maintenance trust funds or otherwise used for the betterment
of the cemetery."' Replatting is rarely undertaken until a cemetery is
almost filled and thus the funds received generally benefit all lotowners.
102 Bushers v. Graceland Cemetery Ass'n, 171 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Ill. 1958);
Humphreys v. Bennett Oil Corp., 195 La. 531, 197 So. 222 (1940). See also Gibson
v. Berry Cemetery Ass'n, 250 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. 1952) (action by relatives to deter-
mine their right to grant oil lease). See generally Note, Oil and Gas: Developing
Cemeteries in Oklahoma for Oil and Gas Purposes, 8 OKLA. L. REv. 474 (1955).
1
0 3 McCullough v. Long Beach Cemetery Ass'n, No. 400134 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1937), in Cemetery Legal Compass, March 1937, p. 37; 2 CASNER, AmERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY § 10.137 (1952).
104 Fergerson v. Utilities Elkhorn Coal Co., 313 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1958).
1
05 Manewitz v. Chevra Ahawath Abraham B'nai Kolo, Inc., 195 Misc. 473, 87
N.Y.S.2d 740 (Sup. Ct. 1949); O'Shaughnessy v. John J. Barnett, Inc., 186 Misc.
1040, 66 N.Y.S.2d 4 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
106E.g., Thomas v. Mobley, 118 So. 2d 476 (La. 1960) (action for trespass
would have been successful). In many states the disturbance of a grave or monument
is a criminal offense. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §267 (1957); NEB. Rv.
STAT. § 28-570 (1956).10 7 King v. Smith, 236 N.C. 170, 72 S.E.2d 425 (1952). See also Thomas v.
Mobley, supra note 106. But see Leleux v. Viator, 55 So. 2d 662 (La. 1951).
'
0s Compare Manewitz v. Chevra Ahawath Abraham B'nai Kolo, Inc., 195 Misc.
473, 87 N.Y.S.2d 740 (Sup. Ct. 1949), with Bushers v. Graceland Cemetery Ass'n,
171 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Ill. 1958), and Smith & Gaston Funeral Directors, Inc. v.
Wilson, 262 Ala. 401, 79 So. 2d 48 (1955) (recovery allowed in trespass).
109 Burke v. Wall, 80 La. 38 (1877) ; Dunbar v. Oconomowoc Cemetery Ass'n,
189 Wis. 164, 207 N.W. 265 (1926); Letter From Raymond Louis Brennan, general
counsel, Interment Ass'n of California, to Montefiore Cemetery Co., Philadelphia,
Pa., Sept. 1, 1960; Letter From James Worley, executive vice president, American
Cemetery Ass'n, to Montefiore Cemetery Co., Philadelphia, Pa., Aug. 16, 1960.
But see City View Cemetery Ass'n v. Salem Mausoleum & Crematorium, 209 Ore.
199, 305 P.2d 379 (1956) (dictum) (lotowner has no interest in land over which
thoroughfare has been constructed).
11o RULES AND REGULATIONS 120-21 (1951).
Ill See, e.g., ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 97.360-.430 (Supp. 1959); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 157.08(4), .09 (1957) (funds may be used for other purposes). This approach is
widely approved. Letter From Raymond Louis Brennan, supra note 109; Letter
From Martin Gaudian, executive vice president, National Assn of Cemeteries, to
Montefiore Cemetery Co., Philadelphia, Pa., Oct. 3, 1960.
CEMETERY LOTS
In many states cemetery lots are freed by statute from attachment and
execution. 112 In some states, this exemption is considered a part of the
freedom granted to homesteads generally; 113 in others, it merely represents
a continuation of a general policy to protect cemetery property and to
prevent it from becoming an item of commerce.114 While this protection
is usually extended to all cemetery lots,"15 one state limits the exemption
to those lots in which a burial has been made."' 6 Inasmuch as lots pur-
chased in advance of need are generally located as near to burials of other
members of the family as possible, allowing attachment prior to burial may
interfere with one of the basic concepts of cemetery law-that the right
to be buried with one's family should be protected. By permitting attach-
ment of such lots, the family group may be split, for lots immediately
adjacent to prior burials are rarely plentiful.
Since a central purpose of the attachment immunity is to avoid com-
mercialism, the exemption should not extend to lots held for speculation.
17
Cemetery lots have a pronounced tendency to rise in price over a period of
time as a result of two factors: additional improvements which enhance
the appearance of the cemetery, and the constant depletion of available
burial space with the corresponding increase in demand from those persons
having relatives buried in the cemetery. In an attempt to exploit this
commercial truth, unscrupulous promoters have promised huge profits on
resale to encourage purchases of large quantities of lots for investment
purposes.118 Many state legislatures have enacted statutes prohibiting
112 ALASKA Cor-P. LAws ANN. § 36-5-7 (1949) ; ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1122
(1956); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §8561; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §4902(a)
(1953); D.C. CODE ANN. §27-111 (1951); IOWA CODE ANN. §627.6(5) (1950);
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1302 (1949); LA. REv. STAT. § 8:3 (1950); ME. Rv.
STAT. ANN. ch. 58, §§ 6, 8, 20 (1954) ; MD. ANN. CODE art 23, § 164 (1957) ; MAss.
ANN. LAws ch. 235, §34(11) (1956); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 5.3162 (1958); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 27.1543 (Supp. 1959) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 306.14, 550.37(4) (1947) ;
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 214.190 (1952) ; MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 9-118, 93-5814 (1947) ;
NB. REv. STAT. §§ 12-517, -520 (1954); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1556 (1956); NEv.
REV. STAT. §§21.090, 83.110 (1959); N.J. REv. STAT. § 8:2-27 (1937); N.Y. REAL
PROP. LAWS §450 (except if no interments); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§1(3),
4 (First), tit. 8, § 7 (1951) ; S.D. CODE § 11.1911 (1939) ; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 26-306,
46-102 (1955) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 34-26 (1950) ; WASH. REv. CODE §§ 68.24.210, .220
(1951).
113 E.g., IOW.A CODE ANN. § 627.6(5) (1950); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.37(4)
(1947).
114 E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 8561; NJ. REv. STAT. § 8:2-27 (1937).
115 However, this rule generally does not extend to lots held for speculation. See
notes 117-21 infra and accompanying text.
116 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAws § 450. See Empire Monument Co. v. Lewis, 252
App. Div. 301, 299 N.Y. Supp. 338 (1937), aff'd, 277 N.Y. 648, 14 N.E.?d 202 (1938).
317 This thesis has been stated by courts in several different contexts. See, e.g.,
Abell v. Proprietors of Green Mount Cemetery, 189 Md. 363, 56 A.2d 24 (1947)
(rules and regulations); In re O'Neilrs Will, 26 N.Y.S._d 395 (Surr. Ct. 1941)
(sale at public auction of cemetery lots which were estate's only assets) ; DuBois
v. Fantinekill Cemetery Ass'n, 118 Misc. 37, 192 N.Y. Supp. 145 (Sup. Ct. 1921)
(rule on divisibility); Memorial Gardens of the Valley, Inc. v. Love, 5 Utah 2d 270,
300 P.2d 628 (1956) (sale of securities).
118 See Blue v. United States, 138 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322
U.S. 736 (1944). Both of the national associations try to prevent their members
from engaging in such tactics. See ACA CODE OF ETHIcS para. 4, reprinted in Am.
Cemetery Ass'n Bull., July 1959, p. 74.
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speculative activity." 9 A few jurisdictions control speculation by allowing
resale only if certain conditions are met,120 and one state has removed the
attachment exemption in the case of speculators.
12
RIGHT OF BURIAL
The most important single right of the owner of a cemetery lot is the
right of burial. It is thus necessary to examine in some detail the rights
of the various classes of potential owners of the lot. The original pur-
chaser's right to determine who shall be buried in his lot 12 is fettered only
by the rules and regulations of the cemetery and by certain minimum
standards of propriety ' 2 3-he may not, for example, bury a dog in a
cemetery for humans.1'2  But having once permitted burial, he may not
thereafter forbid the erection of a suitable monument by the relatives of
the deceased.12 5  Of course, his permission to bury one person does not
automatically give that person's spouse a right of burial as well. 126
Upon the death of the original purchaser, his interest in the lot passes
under any specific devise made in his will.' 27  Much litigation could be
"9Apiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §32-2162 (1956) (misdemeanor, sale void); CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 9682 (misdemeanor); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 19-147 (Supp.
1959) (only new cemeteries prohibited); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.35 (Supp. 1959)
(misdemeanor); IND. ANN. STAT. §21-1024 (1950) (misdemeanor); IOWA CODE
ANN. §566A.11 (Supp. 1960); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 58, §23 (1954) (misde-
meanor, sale void); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 114, § 43B (1957) (sale void, fine or
imprisonment or both); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §9-813 (1947) (mausoleums-
columbariums) (misdemeanor); ORE. REv. STAT. §97.520 (Supp. 1959) ("except
with the consent and approval of the Corporation Commissioner") ; R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 23-18-8 (1956) (fine or imprisonment or both); S.D. CODE § 11.19A10 (Supp.
1960) (cannot represent as desirable speculative investment); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 8-4-10 (Supp. 1959) (misdemeanor); WASH. Rmv. CODE §68.24.130 (1951) (mis-
demeanor).
120ARK STAT. ANN. § 82-421(a) (1960); MD. ANN. CODE art 23, § 164 (1957);
N.J. REv. STAT. § 8:2-22 (1937). Arkansas also withdraws its property tax exemp-
tion if lots are held for speculative purposes. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-206 (third)
(1960).
121 MD. ANN. CODE art 23, § 164 (1957), Burdette v. Jackson, 179 Fed. 229
(4th Cir. 1910).
12 2 The rights of one who buys from the original purchaser are essentially the
same as those of the first owner, except that the buyer may have a better chance of
invalidating, on constitutional grounds, a racial restriction. See notes 75-78 supra
and accompanying text. Additional reasonable restraints may be imposed by the seller.
123 JAcKsoN, THE LAW OF CADAVERS 376-81 (2d ed. 1950).
124 See Hertle v. Riddell, 127 Ky. 623, 106 S.W. 282 (1907).
125E.g., Sherman v. Gray, 150 Me. 13, 102 A.2d 867 (1954). The appropriate
person is the surviving spouse, and not the executor. In the Matter of Estate of
Clark, 5 Misc. 2d 259, 160 N.Y.S.2d 268 (Surr. Ct), appeal dismissed by default,
3 App. Div. 2d 947, 163 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1957). However, there is no absolute right
to have the names of all burials on a family monument, even if this means that no
monument can be erected for those whose names do not appear on the family monu-
ment See Fromer v. Shientag, 16 Misc. 2d 953, 189 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup. Ct 1959).
12 6 In the Matter of Steiner, 179 Misc. 962, 43 N.Y.S.2d 556 (Sup. Ct 1943);
Cemetery Legal Compass, July 1941, p. 270.
127E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §21-1008 (Supp. 1960 (if not specifically devised,
lot becomes inalienable); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 114, § 31 (1932) ; N.J. REv. STAT.
§ 8:2-21 (Supp. 1959). In some jurisdictions a lot may also pass under a written
declaration filed in the office of the cemetery. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 8603.
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prevented if attorneys would add a clause to will forms to provide for such
a devise. In the absence of a specific clause or statutory directive, it has
generally been held that a cemetery lot will pass to the heirs-at-law and -not
to the beneficiary of a residual clause.'28 The reasons most often advanced
in support of this view are that institutions which have no use for the
property-such as hospitals and colleges-may be named as residual
legatees - and that the courts' primary concern should be the protection
of the familial interest in the lot: "It is . . . improbable that one has in
mind a burial lot in a residuary devise. Men are not likely to inventory
it among their assets or to regard it as property to be passed by a will. It
is essentially a family heritage." 130
Many states have enacted statutes providing that a cemetery lot shall
pass to the heirs unless specifically devised.'13 A few of these statutes are
quite specific in designating the classes of persons entitled to burial. 13 2 In
the absence of such a statute, courts have attempted to allocate the remain-
ing spaces,'13 3 usually by applying the general rule that as between equal
owners priority is determined by order of death. 3 4 If there are enough
1 2 8 McWhirter v. Newell, 200 Ill. 583, 66 N.E. 345 (1903) ; McAndrew v. Quirk,
329 Mass. 423, 108 N.E.2d 667 (1952) (based on statute); Herb Estate, 70 Pa.
D. & C. 598 (Orphans' Ct 1950) (based on cemetery rule restricting burial to mem-
bers of family); Petition of Waldron, 26 R.I. 84, 58 Ati. 453 (1904) ; Silva v. Helger,
75 R.I. 397, 67 A.2d 27 (1949) (dictum). Jackson supports this rule, JAcKSON, op.
cit. supra note 123, at 369-70, as do other persons in the field. See Letter From
James Worley, supra note 109; Letter From Raymond Louis Brennan, supra note 109;
Letter From Martin Gaudian, supra note 111; Letter From Harry E. Sanders, secre-
tary, Cemetery Ass'n of Pennsylvania, to Montefiore Cemetery Co., Philadelphia, Pa.,
Aug. 17, 1960. In such a case title passes directly to the heirs and is not subject to
adminstration. In the Matter of Estate of Rosen, 173 Misc. 433, 17 N.Y.S.2d 794
(Surr. Ct. 1940) (based on statute); Cemetery Legal Compass, July 1940, p. 212;
see note 131 infra. However, the executor may be specifically empowered to sell
the lots. In re Wasserman's Estate, 101 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Surr. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279
App. Div. 1062, 113 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1952).
129 Letter From James Worley, supra note 109: "There are too many cemetery
plots belonging to too many schools, hospitals, and other institutions which have no
use for them. The cemetery lot is part of the family institution and should be retained
by the family." See also Herb Estate, supra note 128 (lot should not pass to stranger
to the blood in view of cemetery rule restricting burial to members of family).
130 Petition of Waldron, 26 R.I. 84, 58 Atl. 453 (1904). See Letter From Ray-
mond Louis Brennan, supra note 109: "The family plot is for the family and not for
someone who may be the recipient of the worldly goods of the owner of the family
plot."
'31 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 8603; IND. ANN. STAT. § 21-1008 (Supp.
1960); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 114, §31 (1932); MINN. STAT. ANN. §306.29
(1945); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 9-821 (1947); N.J. REv. STAT. § 8:2-21 (Supp.
1959) (repudiating Mohnkern v. Gennert, 136 N.J. Eq. 86, 40 A.2d 354 (Ch.
1945)); N.Y. MEMBERSHIP CoaP. LAws § 84(6); ORE. REv. STAT. § 97.600 (1959);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.14(15) (Supp. 1959) ; VT. STAT. tit. 15, ch. 182, § 4088
(1947); WASH. REv. CODE § 68.32.040 (1951). Compare NEV. Rrv. STAT. § 83.120
(1959); OKL.A. STAT. ANN. tit 8, § 6 (1941); S.D. CODE § 11.1905 (1939); Wis.
STAT. § 157.10 (1957). See also Hammerstein v. Woodlawn Cemetery, 21 Misc. 2d
42, 194 N.Y.S.2d 385 (Sup. Ct 1960). Contra, MD. ANN. CODE art 23, § 164 (1957)
(descends as real estate to heirs).
132 E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.14 (1945); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 9-829
to -833 (1947).1 3 3 Axelrad v. Axelrad, 180 Misc. 418, 42 N.Y.S.2d 394 (Sup. Ct 1943).
1
3 4 Silva v. Helger, 75 R.I. 397, 67 A.2d 27 (1949). See also Ryan v. Schmit,
1 Wis. 2d 215, 83 N.W.2d 685 (1957) ; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 8651; IND'
ANN. STAT. § 21-1008 (Supp. 1960) ; Cowan, Foresight Can Avert Many Costly Legal
Entanglements, Am. Cemetery, Dec. 1959, pp. 21, 23.
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grave spaces available for all the co-owners, each has a vested interest in at
least one grave space. 35 A few states give the spouse of the decedent a
vested right of burial if there is at least one burial space available.136
When the lot has passed to the heirs there are significant limitations
on their use of the lot. For example, the spouse of a co-owner may not be
buried there over the objection of another co-owner of the lot 137 -- a rule
analogous to the ancient real property doctrine of blood of the first pur-
chaser.138 In various situations it has been held that, before a person may
establish any rights in a cemetery lot, that person must bear a blood rela-
tionship to the original owner.139 The continued vitality of this rule of
blood is traceable in part to the survival in cemetery law of the principle of
limited alienability. Statutes in many states render cemetery lots inalien-
able after the death of the original purchaser or after there has been an
interment in the lot.' 40 Legislation also permits the purchaser to make the
135 Persinger v. Persinger, 39 Ohio Op. 315, 86 N.E.2d 335 (C.P. 1949). But
where there are more than enough spaces the vested owners do not automatically split
the rights in the remaining graves. Axelrad v. Axelrad, 180 Misc. 418, 42 N.Y.S.2d
394 (Sup. Ct. 1943) ; Petition of Waldron, 26 RI. 84, 58 Atl. 453 (1904). In the
only case in which the issue was raised, the court held a co-owner had no vested
right to be buried in a particular grave space in the lot. Ryan v. Schmit, 1 Wis. 2d
215, 83 N.W.2d 685 (1957).
136 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 8601-02, 8651 (spouse, then parents and
children of owner in order of death) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 19-158 (1958) ; IND.
ANN. STAT. §§ 21-1007, -1008 (Supp. 1960) (spouse, then parents and children in order
of death) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS Ch. 114, §§ 29, 32 (wife), 33 (husband) (1932) ; MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 525.14 (1945) ; MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 9-819, -829 to -833 (1947) ;
N.Y. MEmRSHn CORP. LAWS § 88; ORE. IEv. STAT. § 97.570 (1959); TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. art. 912a-12 (1953); VT. STAT. tit. 15, ch. 182, § 4088 (1947); WASH.
Rev. CODE § 68.32.020 (1951). See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 8652 (if no
parent or child, spouse of child followed by heirs-at-law or spouses of heirs-at-law) ;
Mo. REv. STAT. § 214.190 (1949). In many states, the spouse is also given control of
the lot. See Hammerstein v. Woodlawn Cemetery, 21 Misc. 2d 42, 194 N.Y.S.2d
385 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
13 7 Friant v. Dolbow, 41 N.J. Super. 84, 124 A.2d 12 (Super. Ct. 1956) (third
husband of first purchaser's wife not her blood relative). In any case involving the
burial of one who does not have a vested interest, the agreement of all co-owners is
a prerequisite to such burial. Silva v. Helger, 75 RI. 397, 67 A.2d 27 (1949). Nor
may another brother be buried when a lot has been conveyed to two brothers for
the use of their immediate families. Axelrad v. Axelrad, 180 Misc. 418, 42 N.Y.S.2d
394 (Sup. Ct 1943). Furthermore, heirs may exercise only the unused rights in
the lot. Fromer v. Shientag, 16 Misc. 2d 953, 189 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
California provides a statutory exception to this rule. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 8652.
138 See TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1125 (3d ed. 1939).
139 Friant v. Dolbow, 41 N.J. Super. 84, 124 A.2d 12 (Super. Ct. 1956) ; In the
Matter of the Estate of Appelbaum, 146 Misc. 603, 262 N.Y. Supp. 503 (Surr. Ct.
1933) (executors desired to sell mausoleum; decision based in part on New York
alienability law); King v. Smith, 236 N.C. 170, 72 S.E.2d 425 (1952) (action for
trespass) ; Herb Estate, 70 Pa. D. & C. 598 (C.P. 1950) (lot does not pass to stranger
to the blood in view of cemetery rule restricting burial to members of family). How-
ever, mere blood relationship is not sufficient to give title. Gibson v. Berry Cemetery
Ass'n, 250 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1952).
140 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 8650 (after interment of member of family, rela-
tive, or lotowner) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 21-1008 (Supp. 1960) ; MONT. R v. CODES ANN.
§ 9-119 (1957) (after any interment, except may reconvey to cemetery); NEV. Rev.
STAT. § 83.120 (1959) (after any interment); N.J. Rev. STAT. § 8:2-21 (Supp. 1959)
(after any interment); N.Y. MEMBERSHIP CORP. LAWS §§ 84, 86 (after any inter-
ment); OYLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 6 (1951) (while any burial remains); ORE. REv.
STAT. § 97.630 (Supp. 1959) (after interment of member of family, relative, or lot-
CEMETERY LOTS
property inalienable prior to his death by filing appropriate papers with the
cemetery company office.'41 And to prevent relatives from splitting the lot
and attempting to dispose of a part by claiming that only the portion con-
taining burials is inalienable, other statutory provisions make cemetery
lots indivisible.142 Limiting alienability has been viewed by writers 14
3
as necessary and desirable:
There is every reason in logic and sentiment for destroying the alien-
ability of a lot once a burial has been made therein . . .. It is ab-
horrent and shocking to the human sense that the one buried and the
survivors should be denied the solace of burial together, or that those
already interred should be interred among strangers. The person to
whom title to the burial lot with its remaining graves may pass, if
conveyed in the absence of statutory restriction, might permit any
person, perhaps a stranger to the one already interred, to be buried
therein. 144
owner); S.D. CODE § 11.1905 (1939) (while any burial remains); TEX. REv. Civ.
STAT. art. 912a-13 (1953); WASH. REv. CODE § 68.32.060 (1951) (after interment
of member of family, relative, or lotowner) ; Wis. STAT. § 157.10 (1957) (inalienable
without consent of majority of board). See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 306.15 (Supp.
1959). See also Wolford v. Crystal Lake Cemetery Ass'n, 54 Minn. 440, 56 N.W. 56
(1893) (mortgage of cemetery land void); Hammerstein v. Woodlawm Cemetery,
21 Misc. 2d 42, 194 N.Y.S.2d 385 (Sup. Ct 1960) (applying New York statute);
In the Matter of the Estate of Appelbaum, 146 Misc. 603, 262 N.Y. Supp. 503 (Surr.
Ct 1933) (executors' right to sell mausoleum). Lots in which no one is buried do
not come within the rules restraining alienation. Peebler v. Olds, 56 Cal. App. 2d
8, 132 P.2d 233 (Dist. Ct App. 1942); Billings v. Paine, 319 S.W.2d 653, 658-59
(Mo. 1959) (dictum). As to whether rights can be acquired in cemetery property
by adverse possession, compare Locke v. Lester, 78 So. 2d 14 (La. Ct App. 1955)
(private land given over to public use as cemetery held imprescriptible and inalienable
under statute forbidding prescription and alienation of public-use property), with
Billings v. Paine, .rupra at 659-60 (dictum that right to specific, unoccupied lot may
be acquired by adverse possession since no public right is affected).
141 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY. CODE § 8680; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 21, § 31 (Smith-
Hurd 1951); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 21-229, -1009 (1950); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8:2
(1951); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 114, § 28 (1957); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 9-834
(1957) ; NJ. REv. STAT. § 8:2-23 (Supp. 1959) ; WASH. REv. CODE § 68.32.160 (1951).
142 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 8571; ME. Rxv. STAT. ANN. ch. 58, § 6 (1954)
(if under one-half acre) ; N.J. REv. STAT. § 8:2-20 (1939) ; ORE. REv. STAT. § 97.550
(1959); Tan. REv. Cirv. STAT. art. 912a-12 (1953); WAsH. REv. CODE § 68.24.120
(1951). See also DuBois v. Fantinekill Cemetery Ass'n, 118 Misc. 37, 192 N.Y.
Supp. 145 (Sup. Ct 1922); Love v. Robinson, 219 Pa. 469, 68 Atl. 1033 (1908)
(cemetery rule forbidding partition upheld).
143 "A cemetery lot should be inalienable once a burial has been made. This type
of statute was first introduced in the State of New York and was an application to
the cemetery lot of the spendthrift son trust principle. It is in line with the thinking
that cemetery property should not be used for barter or trade, and should be conserved
for the purpose of keeping the entire family together in death as in life." Letter
From Raymond Louis Brennan, supra note 109. See Letter From Harry E. Sanders,
supra note 128. Contra, Cowan, Involvement of Legal Freedom, in 1959-1960 CEME-
TERY YEs=oK 44, 48; Letter From James Worley, spra note 109; Letter From
Martin Gaudian, supra note 111: "A burial plot is similar to any other interest in
real estate. It is owned by a person or persons and he or' they can authorize the
burial of any person in such plot if said person comes within the category permitted
by the Rules and Regulations of the cemetery." The NAC sponsors a lot exchange
program whereby people moving to another part of the country may exchange ceme-




JACKSON, op. cit. supra note 123, at 365.
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This statement represents a point of view developed when the popula-
tion was relatively immobile 145 -most members of families remained for
generations in the same town or city, or near the same rural cemetery.
Under such circumstances it was both logical and natural for courts and
legislatures to protect the family burying place for future members of that
family. If one "black sheep" wished to dispose of the remaining graves
in the family burial plot for his own benefit, 146 a sense of outrage was justly
felt. But today the mobility of the population has increased; since World
War II, a large percentage of the American people has changed residence,
not once, but several times.147 Children move to California, their elders
to Florida. To continue an inflexible requirement that unused graves in
family lots remain forever inalienable and indivisible ignores the realities of
current conditions.
CONCLUSION
From this examination of the rights of the purchaser of a cemetery
lot, it is apparent that an intermixture of religion, sentiment, tradition, and
real property law has created a unique form of property. Our legal system
reflects this special quality in many respects, but much can still be done to
clarify and improve relationships in this area of the law. Attorneys, by
regularly inserting in wills specific devises of cemetery lots, would avoid
the possibility of intrafamily squabbles. Where state statutes forbid
speculation, or where there exists the risk of losing the lot under a state
abandoned lot law, 148 counsel may spare his client heavy losses by pointing
out these restrictions upon property rights in cemetery lots. Through ex-
planation of the cemetery's rules and regulations, the lawyer can prevent
later misunderstandings by the lotowner concerning limits on types or sizes
of monuments or the extent of permissible plantings.
State courts and legislatures have an obligation to provide adequate
protection and treatment of this genus of property, consistent with its
unusual nature. Some states have not passed even the most elementary
laws in this area of vital public concern.
The purchaser of a burial lot also must be aware of the legal limita-
tions upon his ownership rights. An informed buyer can be the difference
between solace and aggravation for his family. The widespread ignorance
of and indifference to this area of the law benefits neither society nor the
individual.
R.S.
145 See LERNER, AMERICA AS A CIVILIZATION 98 (1957).
146 Brennan suggests an analogy to a spendthrift trust. See note 143 supra.
147U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUaAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS
OF THE UNIm STATES ser. C 80-87, at 47 (1960).
148 See note 25 supra.
